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reclamation project in Korea, which has been the cause of significant social debate for 
around 10 years. In the policy process of the Saemangeum reclamation project, the severe 
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Introduction
In modern society, environmental problems are considered as significant 
issues having both a direct and indirect influence on human life at the 
national or global level. As a consequence of the compressed modernization 
of Korea, various environmental pollution issues arose in the 1980s. And 
despite the slight improvement in environmental quality, environmental 
conflicts resulting from large national development projects have recurred 
after the 1990s. The Korean government has played a dominant role in the 
social debate on development and environment by performing large-scale 
development projects such as reclamation, road and railroad building, dam 
construction, and nuclear power-generation projects. Another important 
player in the process of large-scale development projects was the civil society 
with NGOs at the center. They appealed to public sentiment by bringing up 
various environmental issues, and influenced the decision-making process of 
national environmental policies. 
Various stakeholders such as government, private companies, civil 
society, mass media, and political groups have participated in the 
environmental policy process, and each of them would try to shift the policy 
direction to their desired course. Government policy affects society 
members. If a policy was changed as a result of learning from past failure, and 
to solve or prevent similar problems, social conflict and damage could be 
reduced. The case of the radioactive waste disposal site decision, which was 
an issue for a long time in Korean society, shows that a policy can indeed be 
changed as a result of learning from previous failures. 
Since 1986 the government had pushed the policy, but it continued to 
fail because of local residents and the protests of civic organizations. In 2005 
it selected Gyeongju for the site. According to the studies comparing Buan 
and Gyeongju, the proposed sites before the selection (Kang and Chang 2007; 
Kim 2011), the reason for the policy’s success is that the government 
improved the policy with instruments that reflected risk perception and the 
demand of local residents. The government established a special law stating 
that waste disposal was only for intermediate and low-level waste, not high-
level waste. The law also clarified economic compensation and introduced a 
local referendum. This institutional change led to the success of the policy. As 
we see in both cases, a policy decision is affected by a previous one, and 
influences the administration or the establishment of the next step when the 
decision is made. However, the type and level of learning and aspects of the 
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change in the process will vary depending on its character or the policy 
target.
This study will explore policy changes involving the Saemangeum 
reclamation project in Korea, which has been the cause of a significant social 
debate related to development and environmental protection for around 10 
years, since the mid-1990s. The Saemangeum reclamation project, which is 
the largest project of its kind in the world, started in 1991 and is still in 
progress. Because the West Sea of Korea has a large tidal range, there have 
been not a few reclamation projects at the foreshore. But after the 1960s, and 
especially after the 1980s, large-scale reclamation projects led by the 
government have been raging (Rural Development Corporation 1995, p. 45).1
Reclamation has for a long time been considered as a beneficial policy 
enabling the securing of farmland or land for city development. But in the 
early process of the Saemangeum reclamation project, a severe water 
pollution crisis at the site of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project occurred. 
The water quality of the artificial lake deteriorated rapidly, and fish and 
shellfish died after a sea wall was built as part of the reclamation project. 
Facing this crisis, civil society has been concerned about the coastal marine 
environment following such a large-scale reclamation project. Even though 
environmental awareness and the conservation movement have rapidly 
grown in Korea after the 1990s, the focus was only on onshore pollution 
issues such as the establishment of a radioactive waste disposal facility and 
the construction of a large dam. Before the occurrence of the severe water 
pollution crisis at the site of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project, the main 
environmental concern in Korean civil society was not the value of the 
coastal marine environment. It was instead regarding practical interests such 
as contaminated water, air pollution and the pollution of the natural 
environment. 
After the broadcast of media reports covering the black water pollution 
in Lake Shihwa and the deaths of fish and shellfish, civil society showed 
extreme concern about the Saemangeum reclamation project bringing more 
severe destruction of the foreshore and marine ecosystem beyond that at the 
site of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project. Above all things, the size of the 
area of the reclamation land at Saemangeum is over 2 times greater than that 
of the site at Lake Shihwa. Moreover the Korean government was attempting 
1 The area for the reclamation project was rapidly expanded as the government started to lead in 
earnest reclamation projects. The mean area for one reclamation project was 0.36 km2 in the 1960s, 
123.1 km2 in 1990-1994 and 319.5 km2 in 1995 (Koh 2001, p. 695).
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to become a member of ‘The Convention on Wetlands of International 
Importance Especially as a Waterfowl Habitat’ when the severe water 
pollution crisis at the site of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project occurred in 
1996 (Prime Minister’s Office 2011, p. 187). Undergoing these situations, civil 
society, with environmental NGOs as the center, realized the value of tidal 
flats and marine ecosystems. For these reasons, Korean civil society 
consisting of environmental NGOs, professionals and religious people has 
begun to show concern about the Saemangeum reclamation project’s causing 
of water pollution and its destruction of the foreshore and fishing 
community. Additionally, it has begun to doubt the economic feasibility of 
the project. As a result, the Saemangeum reclamation project in its early stage 
has resulted in the raising of environmental, political and social issues. 
This project was chosen as the focus of this study on learning and policy 
change in the policy process for the following reasons: First, compared to 
other projects, environmental issues started to be brought up, and the project 
has been the cause of a significant social debate for around 10 years, since the 
mid-1990s. Second, those involved with the project had a chance to learn 
from what had happened during another project, the water pollution that had 
occurred at the site of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project. Chronologically, 
the target period of this study is the stage between the start of the reclamation 
project and the building of a sea-wall, which is the first stage of the project.2
The first research question of this study is: Why was the Saemangeum 
reclamation project met with the resistance of civil society during the early 
stage of the project, as compared with the Lake Shihwa reclamation project, 
which had proceeded without any critical social debate? The second research 
question of this study is: Did the policy regarding the Saemangeum 
reclamation project change as a result of learning, and if so, what were the 
main causes for any changes made?
To answer the questions, I will review civil participation in the 
environmental policy and the Event-Related Policy Change Model as 
theoretical references in the next section. In section 3 I will describe the 
responses of policy actors to the water pollution that occurred at Lake Shihwa 
as a focusing event. Section 4 deals with the level of learning by the actors 
and changes in the policy process of the Saemangeum project due to the 
water pollution event at Lake Shihwa. Last, section 5 is the conclusion that 
sums up the study and reviews the importance and limitations of the study.
2 Usually a large-scale reclamation project takes over 10-20 years, and proceeds with two stages. 
First, the seawater flow is stopped with a seawall, and then a freshwater lake and land inside.
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Theoretical Background and Analytical Framework
Environmental Policy and Civil Participation 
Various agents are involved in the policy decision-making process, and 
the policy is the product of the complex adjustment among these 
participants. The major agents involved in the policy process would be the 
government, the market and the civil society. Civil society, in a modern view, 
would indirectly exert its influence through political society (Cohen and 
Arato 1992, p. 504, citing Joo 2011). The theory on policy governance and the 
political opportunity structure between the government and the civil society 
both explain the effect of civil society as the impact power for the policy and 
society through participation in the policy decision-making process (Joo 
2011). Environmental movement groups have especially taken interest in the 
commons such as the Antarctic Circle and oceanosphere, and influence 
environmental policies through active global cooperation with their supra-
boundary nature (Yearly 1994).
Ulrich Beck (1992) defined the modern society as a risk society and saw 
that science was one of the risk factors. He also defined the risk through 
science and found a solution to counter it. It is because most risks in the 
modern society, including environmental issues, are outside of direct human 
perception; they are spread by science, and strictly speaking, they are made 
up in a scientific manner. According to his risk society theory, environmental 
problems and risks are unavoidable results arising from industrialization and 
instrumental rationality. To resolve these problems, reflexive modernization 
is required, which stresses concession and cooperation among the 
government, private companies, professionals and civil society.
Although science is important in recognizing and solving environmental 
problems, the exclusive authority of science and scientific knowledge has 
been threatened by the effect of the social constructivism of science and 
technology. Experts’ disagreements on environmental issues like power 
plants, the building of toxic waste disposal facilities, radiation, fluoridation 
and so on have led the public to participate more in policy decision-making 
on related science and technology as they gave rise to doubts about the role of 
scientists as neutral arbitrators (Nelkin 1995). It is impossible to make a clear, 
scientific decision about potentially dangerous threats because science and 
technology are characterized by some uncertainty and ambiguity due to their 
open systems, like the environment, unlike the situation in a closed lab 
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(Funtowicz and Ravets 1992; Yearly 1992).
Most environmental problems are newly emerging issues, so they are 
still in the stage of hypothesis, which means that it has not yet been proven 
how to measure and predict the causes and effects. The uncertainty and 
ambiguity of science and technology can be causes leading up to or 
intensifying the conflicts between the stakeholders in the policy process 
related to environmental matters. Funtowitcz and Ravets (1992) define the 
problems linked to science and technology in the modern society as ‘post-
normal science’ that cannot be solved by puzzle-solving. They are unclear, the 
level of value conflict is deep, related interests are rather huge and also a fast 
decision needs to be made. In most cases, they were a field led by disputes. 
They also argued that the general public and nonscientific factors need to be 
included, as experts can be mere amateurs due to the uncertainty of science. 
Environmental changes have a close relationship with social processes, so 
environmental problems have to be discussed along with their political and 
economic contexts.
Irwin classified the political approaches to environmental threats into 
expert, democratic and pragmatic approaches (Irwin 1995, pp. 64-77).3 And 
he regarded the pragmatic approaches as the most desirable for 
environmental policy, because they could cover both the expert and 
democratic approaches, and could have the potential to mediate among 
different voices and interests through less formalized and more flexible ways. 
While the expert or democratic approaches stress scientific methods for 
managing environmental threats, pragmatic approaches could reflect various 
opinions as well as scientific methods.
Focusing Event and Policy Change
A policy is not fixed and can be changed as a result of various factors. 
Thus a policy decision is a step in a series and circle of policy process. There 
have been many models to describe the causes and process of policy change. 
Thomas A. Birkland shows the Event-Related Policy Change Model, and he 
argues that after unexpected events happen, various interested groups learn 
while they deal with them and the policy is more likely to be changed as the 
3 He criticized that the expert approach was based on the assumption that expert assessment 
could lead to a rational and objective policy decision, but in reality it could not. Moreover the 
democratic or representative approach could have appeared with the demand asking for a 
democratic step in the decision-making process. But this could not pass the limit for covering civil 
prospects, owing to its main interest in technological consult.
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result of the knowledge gained. In other words, this model explains that 
policy change is related to a focusing event that increases people’s concern, 
and the concept of learning in which people apply new information and ideas 
to the policy decision (Lee 2012).
Birkland (1998, 2006) said a focusing event prompting policy change is a 
sudden event that is a disaster or an accident like an earthquake, hurricane, 
oil spill, nuclear accident, or terrorist attack. There are, however, a lot of 
accidents that do not become focusing events in the policy domain. He 
defines a potential focusing event as “an event that is sudden, relatively rare, 
can be reasonably defined as harmful or revealing the possibility of greater 
potential future harms, inflicts harms or suggests potential harms that are or 
could be concentrated on a definable geographical or community of interest, 
and that is known to policymakers and the public virtually simultaneously” 
(Birkland 1997; 2006).
A focusing event draws public attention by providing the evidence of 
policy failure. When a focusing event happens, the public and the 
policymakers start to examine the issue at the same time. A focusing event 
such as a disaster absorbs non-policy agenda issues in the interested groups, 
policy activities, lobby and research into the policy domain (Birkland 2006, p. 
5). Also, it brings about the change of reviewing unofficial idea and policies 
that were considered politically unpleasant or unnecessary before the event.4 
A focusing event provides an opportunity for a new group that verifies a new 
problem and comes up with a counterplan in the policy process, and gives 
out-of-power groups a chance to present their preference for policy (Birkland 
1998; 2006, p. 159). Increased attention given to a focusing event can affect 
the existing policy trends.
Birkland (2006, pp. 18-23) argued that a focusing event mobilizes groups 
and the mobilization of the groups would increase the discussion about the 
policy ideas. Most of the participants, not all of them, want to explain or solve 
the problem that a focusing event unfolded. However, proposed solutions 
vary depending on the concerns and motives of the participants. If a focusing 
event shows the failure of the policy, it will discuss the ways that can 
overcome the failure and prevent it from occurring again.
4 According to studies on learning, regarding policy change after the September 11 attacks, all of 
next thing were known well before 9.11: people are not safe from terrorist attacks, and airports and 
critical infrastructure are vulnerable and so on. But people haven’t paid attention to them. The 
existence of many off-the-shelf ideas in circulation before the event made the adoption of new policy 
instruments much easier. Above all, the perception of a terrorist attack was changed from a virtual 
thing to a real threat (Birkland 2006).
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He defined learning as a process in which people apply new information 
and ideas or information and ideas promoted to an agenda by a recent event 
in the policy decision. He shows three types of policy learning: instrumental, 
social and political policy learning. The key indicators of instrumental policy 
learning are the media reports, testimonies in the national assembly, a change 
in the law and so on; a change in the law is the most immediate and 
important evidence of learning. Policy redefinition involved in the change of 
the direction, goal or scope for the policy falls under the key indicators of 
social policy learning. It includes the basic access methods to the policy and 
the contents of the essence of the government actions rather than a simple 
adjustment to the problem. Lastly, it is hard to find evidence for political 
learning. But it happens when the people for and against the policy change 
have changed their political strategies to accept new information (Birkland 
2006, pp. 15-7).
There are some factors that promote or hinder learning in the policy 
process (Birkland 2006, pp. 173-7). The Media reports on which political 
strategy succeeded or failed and can present the matter in a specific way; 
thus, media attention can promote learning. On the other hand, the character 
of the organization can boost or impede learning. Even though there is 
knowledge to promote the policy outcomes, the policymakers are able to 
limit their selection with political or other factors. 
Analytical Framework
As indicated above, it calls for the engagement of civil society, including 
various stakeholders, to solve environmental problems and risks in modern 
society because science has some uncertainty and ambiguity in its open 
system unlike the situation in a closed lab. In the case of environmental 
problems, civil society could raise issues, appeal to public sentiment, and 
have a decisive effect on the environmental policy-making process. Birkland 
argued that policy change could start from a sudden event that drew social 
interest, which is called a focusing event. When a focusing event happens, a 
variety of groups linked to the event could mobilize in the policy domain. 
The mobilization leads to some discussion on different ideas and the 
participants learn something in the process. Then the policy can be changed 
as a result of the learning that takes place.
The policy domain of the Saemangeum reclamation project should learn 
something from the water pollution that occurred at the site of the Lake 
Shihwa reclamation project, and the policy change could be predictable from 
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the result of the learning. The agents participating in the policy-making 
process would react differently to the focusing event, and their impact size on 
policy change size would also be different. Based on the discussion above, an 
analytical framework was devised for this study on the learning and the 
change in the policy process for the Saemangeum reclamation project, and it 
is shown in Fig. 1. 
Water Pollution at Lake Shihwa as the Focusing Event 
The Lake Shihwa reclamation project, which started 4 years earlier than 
the Saemangeum project, is a large-scale reclamation project launched by the 
Korean government. It is the second largest reclamation project after the 
Saemangeum project. The purpose of this project was to build a 12.7 km-long 
seawall in the Shihwa estuary at the West Coast of Gyeonggi Province and 
create a 56.5 km2-wide freshwater lake as well as to develop 110 km2 of new 
tidelands into farmland and industrial complex and towns. The construction 
of the seawall was started in June 1987 and was completed in January 1994. 
And Lake Shihwa was created. It should be noted that there had been little 
social concern about this project during the construction of the seawall.
Until the severe water pollution crisis occurred at the site of the Lake 
Shihwa reclamation project, the major policy agents had been the Korea 
Rural Community Corporation and the Korea Water Resources Corporation, 
both of which are government-affiliated organizations. These organizations 
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had recognized the existence of water pollution through a post-hoc 
environmental effects evaluation, but had only considered countermeasures 
in their limited intra-organization territory. The Ministry of Environment 
should have managed and controlled these government-affiliated 
organizations, but was unable to perform its role in the growth-first 
administration system at that time (Lee 2007, pp. 25-6).
On the other hand, little effort was required for environmental 
movement groups to bring up the water pollution event as a social issue. The 
Korean environmental movement had markedly grown in the 1990s,5 but had 
only concentrated its capacity on the matter of frequent onshore pollution 
issues. Faced with an unfamiliar coastal environmental event, Korean 
environmental movement groups had been unsuccessful in their ability to 
make it into a social issue.6 Moreover the community residents, as those 
engaged in the fishing industry, had not opposed the Lake Shihwa 
reclamation project. They could not have had the will to oppose the national 
project for national development, and had vague confidence that a 
livelihood-threatening accident would not occur. Some had even been 
compensated with cash, which had made them feel more welcoming of the 
national project (Han 2001).
Yet even before the development of the tidal flats, on April, 25th, 1996 
the media reported that the contaminated water of Lake Shihwa was released 
to the open sea so that the water pollution of Lake Shihwa7 was on the rise. 
The creation of land through reclamation was delayed for quite a long time8 
5 The Korean Federation for the Environmental Movement, the most representative 
environmental movement group, was established by unifying localized anti-pollution movement 
groups in 1993, and most of the local environmental movement groups at Lake Shihwa ware 
established in the mid-1990s.
6 In the interviews with some environmental movement group activists (Lee 2007, p. 54), an 
activist from a civil environmental research institute said, “We had internally discussed the water 
pollution at the site of Lake Shihwa, but it was not in-depth.” And an activist from An-San YMCA 
said, “Some professions predicted that water pollution would occur after building a seawall, but as a 
local organization, we could not actively cope with that owing to our lack of capability.”
7 The water quality of Lake Shihwa was 17.4mg/L of mean COD (Chemical Oxygen Demand) 
concentration in 1997 after the construction of the Shihwa seawall even though the water quality 
was 2-3mg/L of mean COD before the construction (Ministry of Land, Transport and Maritime 
Affairs 2011, p. 35; 2012). The water pollution of Lake Shihwa was caused because sea water 
circulation in the lake was blocked due to reinforcement work of the seawall, and industrial waste 
and domestic sewage was released to the lake in the lake watershed (Ministry of Environment 1996).
8 Farmland development was started comparatively earlier because the plan of utilizing Lake 
Shihwa for agriculture had been nixed. But the development of an industrial complex and towns has 
just started in 2007 and 2012, respectively. 
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after the water pollution event occurred at Lake Shihwa.
The media continues to report the inflow of industrial waste from 
neighbors, ten thousands of dead fishes and so on. The media has referred to 
Lake Shihwa as “the dead lake,” “the rotten fresh water,” and “the 
environmental disaster.” The reports made the entire country aware of the 
water pollution at Lake Shihwa, and interested groups immediately 
responded to the event.9 Because of the water pollution event, the original 
plan of using Lake Shihwa for agriculture was nixed in 1998, and in 
December 2000, the government announced the decision that the lake would 
remain as a sea water lake, not a freshwater lake (Ministry of Environment 
2000).
As a social agenda, the severe water pollution crisis that occurred at the 
site of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project resulted in the expansion of social 
concern so that questions arose about the Saemangeum reclamation project. 
The media referred to Lake Saemangeum as the second Lake Shihwa after the 
completion of the seawall. And it expressed concerns that the same problems 
that had occurred at Lake Shihwa might occur at the site of the Saemangeum 
reclamation project. Prior to the water pollution event at Lake Shihwa, there 
had hardly been any press coverage about the Saemangeum project. However, 
the event resulted in an increasing number of media reports on the 
Saemangeum project. The reports also changed in that they now focused on 
the negative or irrational aspects of the project instead of the positive ones 
(Park 2007, pp. 93-4). Politicians also expressed concerns about this problem 
in the parliamentary inspection of the administration in 1997. NGOs held a 
nationwide protest against the project as well as local ones and were 
supported by experts in various fields. The water pollution event led to 
critical discussions about the effects of the reclamation projects, including the 
water pollution of a freshwater lake, and the effect on mud-flat and coastal 
environments, which had never been discussed before.
9 The president ordered measures for water improvement to be set up. The Board of Audit and 
Inspection conducted a special inspection of the water pollution. The Ministry of Environment set 
up the Water Quality Improvement Plan of Lake Shihwa three months after the event (Prime 
Minister’s Office 1999). Fishermen near the seawall were asking for compensation for the damage 
caused, and NGOs claimed that the seawall had to be removed or the gate should be open to allow 
seawater to flow.
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Learning and Policy Change in the Saemangeum Reclamation 
Project
Overview of the Saemangeum Reclamation Project
In 1989, the decision was made to start the Saemangeum reclamation 
project, which is the largest project of its kind in the world. The goal of this 
project was to close the sea between Gunsan City and Buan City in Jeollabuk-
do province with a 33.9 km-long seawall and create an 118 km2-wide 
freshwater lake and 283 km2 of farmland. According to the original plan, the 
project was planned to proceed from 1991 to 2004, and the seawall was 
planned to be constructed until 1998.
The construction of the seawall started in 1991, and was finally 
completed in 2006. During this period, NGOs’ resistance to the project, 
stimulated by the water pollution of Lake Shihwa, caused three interruptions. 
After the water pollution event, construction was interrupted when a public-
private co-investigation was held at the demand of environmental groups and 
the governor of Jeollabuk-do. The project was also interrupted twice due to a 
lawsuit. Some environmental organizations and fisheries in that region 
brought up a lawsuit for canceling the Saemangeum reclamation license in 
2000-2003. The construction of the seawall was restarted in March 2006, and 
it was completed in April. After the seawall construction was completed, the 
government began to discuss the Saemangeum Lake development strategy 
and then the Master Plan was established in 2011. The area within 
Saemangeum Lake has partially been developed since 2010, and seawater has 
 Fig. 2.—The area of Saemangeum Reclamation Project (Left: 1990, Right: 2007) 
(Source: Korea Ocean Satellite Center at KIOST)
 Learning from an Environmental Pollution Event and Policy Change 203
periodically been circulated to improve water quality (Prime Minister’s Office 
2011).
Group Mobilization and Change in the Dominant Topic
It was the environmental groups that first reacted to the water pollution 
event at Lake Shihwa and raised protests about the Saemangeum reclamation 
project. When the event occurred, a local environmental group first argued 
that Saemangeum Lake could be the second Lake Shihwa.10 Thus, 
environmental issues about the Saemangeum reclamation project became a 
social agenda. NGOs claimed the possibility of the water pollution of 
Saemangeum Lake and the importance of tidelands, and they demanded the 
reexamination and cancellation of the project. In 1998 the “Civil Committee 
for rescinding the Saemangeum reclamation project” was organized at the 
national level and the “Civil Society Joint Committee” was organized in 
Jeollabuk-do. The “Civil Committee for rescinding the Saemangeum 
reclamation project” was expanded to the “Life and Peace Alliance of the 
Saemangeum Tidal Flat,” and it was composed of more than 200 
environmental, social, and religious organizations (Park 2007, p. 141).
Environmental groups exerted their influence on the decision-making 
process through their association with domestic NGOs and foreign 
environmental groups. Korea-Japan environmental groups published a joint 
declaration for summoning the cessation of the Saemangeum reclamation 
project in 1991, and maintained their opinion at the Ramsar Convention that 
Saemangeum should be an internationally important wetland. In 2001 some 
activists of Friends of the Earth visited Korea, and took part in a 
demonstration for the cessation of the Saemangeum reclamation project (Lee 
2003).
Besides NGOs, experts in the fields of environment, economy, and 
society participated in this debate. As the government established a public-
private co-investigation in the Prime Minister’s Office in response to the 
requests of NGOs, experts became officially involved in this debate. But as 
they could not come to an agreement, more and more experts became 
involved. In October 2001, more than 100 experts in the fields of 
environment, economy, and society established the “Korean Society of 
Saemangeum Life.”11 
10 The Dong-A Ilbo. December 9, 1996
11 The Hankook Ilbo. October 12, 2001.
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After the Lake Shihwa water pollution event, the government took a look 
at this project again because of the critical media reports. The Board of Audit 
and Inspection conducted a special audit on the Saemangeum reclamation 
project in 1998, and announced that there were problems with the freshwater 
quality countermeasures and the economic feasibility of this project (Board 
of Audit and Inspection 1998). But the Ministry for Food, Agriculture, Forest 
and Fisheries and the Korea Rural Community Corporation had 
continuously argued that the water pollution of Saemangeum Lake would not 
occur because the conditions are different.12 As for the government, the 
Prime Minister’s Office was to take a leading role in this debate because the 
position of the government’s departments was different on the possibility of 
water pollution occurrence at Saemangeum Lake.
Political circles also took notice of the Saemangeum reclamation project. 
The worries about water pollution at Saemangeum Lake were proposed in 
the parliamentary inspection of the administration, and the 15th presidential 
transition committee defined the Kyung-Bu High Speed Railway project, the 
Lake Shihwa reclamation project, and the Saemangeum reclamation project 
as 3 insolvent projects. But the Saemangeum reclamation project had been a 
regular subject in parliamentary elections, local government elections, and 
even non-related counties’ local parliamentary elections. And since the 
Saemangeum project plan had been announced, every president had 
promised to support this project13 (Choi 2009, pp. 68-70). Besides political 
circles, regional parliament, media, and the “Saemangeum comprehensive 
development projects Committee,” which was composed of local residents 
and the local Chamber of Commerce & Industry, had worked to carry this 
project forward.
As for this, various groups interested in the Saemangeum reclamation 
project were mobilized in the domain of discussing possible environmental 
problems. Before the event, a debate on the utilization of the reclaimed land 
had proceeded among some of the stakeholders. Distinct from the situation 
of the Lake Shihwa reclamation project, environmental groups developed an 
opposition movement against the Saemangeum reclamation project through 
banded activity with foreign environmental groups, professionals as well as 
domestic professionals, local residents and religious people. This response 
occurred because the severe water pollution crisis acted as a focusing event, 
12 Maeil Business Newspaper. June 6, 1999.
13 Various presidents had promised to support the Saemangeum reclamation project, expressing it 
to be “A new origin of Jeonbuk development,” “an advanced base of production and trade in the pan-
Western ocean region”, and “a growth engine for national development”. 
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showing that a reclamation project could be transformed into an 
environmental crisis. And because Korean environmental groups had 
abruptly grown from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s (Ku and Hong 2013), 
they could lead the formation of public opinion against the Saemangeum 
reclamation project.
Before the water pollution event, a debate on the utilization of the 
reclaimed land had proceeded among some of the interested groups. But after 
the event, the debate topic changed into whether “the Saemangeum 
reclamation project should be interrupted or not considering the 
environmental aspects.” The specific main discussion topics were as follows: 
first, whether Saemangeum Lake would be polluted after the completion of 
the seawall; second, how great the value of the tidal flats was, in other words, 
which was more valuable between the tidal flats and farmland; third, whether 
the seawall construction and tidal flats’ conversion into land would have 
adverse effects on the coastal ecosystem.
Learning and Policy Change
Has the Saemangeum reclamation policy indeed changed through the 
discussion process with various stakeholders about the possibility of 
environmental problems arising from the Saemangeum reclamation project? 
If so, what were the driving causes for the change?
First, as the result of social learning, the opinion of tidal flats changed 
from the view of them as wilderness areas to as somewhat valuable resources. 
There is a special meaning of reclamation in areas in Korea of high 
population density in the sense of making new farmland. So a reclamation 
project which can make rice and land has been viewed as a natural and 
beneficial project. But the Lake Shihwa water pollution event resulted in a 
dramatic change regarding the opinion of tidal flats. Tidal flats are no longer 
seen as wasteland, but as playing an important role in purifying pollutants 
from land, and forming fish and helping to develop fisheries’ resources.
Awareness transition on the view of tidal flats was reflected in actual 
policy. The Public Waters Reclamation Act, which was enacted in 1962, was 
the only law on tidal flats. This act was made for promoting the interests of 
the public and contributing to the development of the national economy 
through reclaiming public waters and using them efficiently. This act was 
made for defining how to develop and use tidal flats, not for defining how to 
protect and manage them (Moon 2000, p. 365). In the process of social debate 
about the Saemangeum reclamation project, tidal flats became recognized as 
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treasures for biodiversity and implements for purifying polluted areas. In 
1999 the Public Waters Reclamation Act was revised, and the Wetlands 
Conservation Act was made for the systemic management of wetlands and 
coastal tidal flats (Yun, Park and Shin 2009, p. 15).
The reason for revising the act was to strictly assess the environmental 
impact of the reclamation of public waters as environmental destruction has 
been a serious problem due to the reclamation of public waters such as tidal 
flats. The Wetlands Conservation Act, in fact, was to be introduced by the 
government, which was planning to join the Ramsar Convention at that time. 
The act was brought before the National Assembly in 1997, but the 
deliberation process was delayed because members of the National Assembly 
were aware that most voters preferred economic development over 
environmental protection. 
Even though instrumental learning following the discussions on the 
Saemangeum project may not have had a direct influence, the Revising 
Public Waters Reclamation Act and the Publishing Wetlands Conservation 
Act are evidences that such discussions can affect policy. More direct 
evidence of instrumental learning is that the government established the 
“Saemangeum Environmental Countermeasures Committee” in the Prime 
Minister’s Office and devised water quality improvement measures. The 
management of environmental problems in the Prime Minister’s Office, not 
in a governmental department, was a significant change. Because it is the 
reality that departments related to development are more influential in policy 
decision-making than the departments related to the environment, such a 
change was meaningful although it was a superficial change.
Examining the contents of the water quality improvement measures, we 
noted that the government directly learned from the Lake Shihwa water 
pollution event. Saemangeum water quality improvement measures were 
prepared by separating measures for lessening influent pollutants within the 
lake and in the coastal sea. The most important part is that water quality is 
managed by sea water circulation through the gates of the seawall until the 
desired water quality at Saemangeum Lake is achieved (Prime Minister’s 
Office 2011, pp. 189-203). Because there were few pre-measures for 
improving the influent water quality before the desalination of Lake Shihwa, 
the government could learn about rapid water quality pollution.
In the domain of Saemangeum reclamation project policy, it is difficult 
to find evidence of political learning after the Lake Shihwa water pollution 
event. According to Birkland, political learning happens when the people for 
and against the policy change have changed their political strategies to accept 
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new information. Interested groups involved in the policy domain hardly 
changed their stance on the project. In political circles, however, some 
politicians asked for special measures following the criticism of the media 
and NGOs, but the majority of them were still emphasizing that the 
Saemangeum reclamation project should be continued. This is because there 
existed lots of groups seeking regional economic growth such as the 
“Saemangeum Comprehensive Development Projects Committee” in 
Jeollabuk-do.
Conclusion
According to this analysis, we could figure out why the Saemangeum 
reclamation project had desperately been opposed by civil society in contrastt 
to the situation surrounding the Lake Shihwa reclamation project. We also 
concluded what had been learned from the severe water pollution crisis at the 
site of Lake Shihwa, and how the policy was changed.
Civil society could recognize that an environmental disaster might occur 
during the reclamation project, because the severe water pollution crisis at 
Lake Shihwa had arisen at the seawall-building stage of the Saemangeum 
reclamation project. That is, the severe water pollution crisis at Lake Shihwa 
acted as a focusing event which would concentrate civil society’s interest on 
the environmentally adverse effects of the Saemangeum reclamation project. 
And from the mid-1990s to the mid-2000s, environmental movement groups 
had rapidly grown so that they could have a decisive effect on the policy-
making process with public opinion. This could also contribute to the 
change. 
The severe water pollution crisis at Lake Shihwa allowed the 
environmental, social, and economic problems of the reclamation project to 
become a social agenda though the project had rarely received attention prior 
to the crisis. Various stakeholders participated in the Saemangeum 
reclamation policy, and discussed controversial issues. Most of all, 
environmental groups led a crusade against the Saemangeum reclamation 
project along with foreign environmental groups, professionals as well as 
local residents, professionals, and religious people. They discussed various 
ideas about the possibility of water pollution of Lake Saemangeum, the 
adverse effects of reclamation on the foreshore and marine ecosystem, and 
the value of the foreshore to prevent the repetition of a severe water pollution 
crisis. The policy domain of the project learned socially and instrumentally 
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through the discussion process. The perception of tidal flats was changed in 
society, and the system of protecting and managing tidal flats rather than 
reclaiming them was made through the discussion of ideas. Also, 
Saemangeum water quality management measures were directly influenced 
by the Lake Shihwa water pollution event. 
The finding of this study is that it is to a different extent for the policy-
making participants to react to a focusing event, and to learn from a 
preceding event. In the Saemangeum reclamation policy, environmental 
groups reacted to the focusing event more sensitively than other policy 
participants, and were motivated and active in discussion. As a result, they 
could have a decisive effect on the government policy and civil society. On 
the other hand, the government, as a main agent, reacted to the focusing 
event less sensitively than civil society, and could get little learning effect due 
to the focusing event. Political groups have rarely changed their strategy in 
spite of the learning effect owing to the community groups who desired local 
economic development. 
This study is meaningful in that two large-scale reclamation projects 
caused significant social debates for around 10 years, from the mid-1990s to 
the mid-2000s. One was seen as providing opportunities for learning and the 
other as changing its policy due to the lesson learned from the earlier project. 
Like this, the Event-Related Policy Change Model is useful for the research of 
policy change due to the learning effect because this model analyzes the 
series of policy processes including agenda setting, group mobilization, ideas 
discussion and policy adoption. But there is a limitation in that every relation 
between learning and policy change is not clear in this model. The process of 
discussion after a focusing event is affected by social and political factors 
outside of a specific policy domain, and this aspect is also a part of driving 
policy change. 
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